THE UGLY RUSSIAN
By Victor Lasky
New York, Trident Press, 1965
313 pp., US$4.95
Reviewed by Charles C. Clayton
Although the title suggests that this book is a study of Russia's failures in wooing the underdeveloped nations, emphasis is also given to Communist China's conspicuous lack of success in foreign aid. It is of interest in Taiwan not only for the light it sheds on the rift between Moscow and Peiping, but also as a yardstick to measure Nationalist China's overseas programs against those of Communist China.
It is Lasky's thesis that the free world tends to overlook Communist blunders throughout the underdeveloped countries, and therefore has given both Moscow and Peiping far too much credit. On the contrary, he writes, "at times it would appear as if the Communists are trying to prove that they can outbungle the Americans 'in the art of bungling." But he warns that even though the Communists are not ten feet tall, as they would like the free world to believe, we must remember that "Communism is a dynamic conspiracy that seeks to dominate the world." In other words, though they may be four feet, rather than ten feet tall, they are still ugly.
The author is an American newspaperman. Formerly a Washington correspondent, he has worked for the New York World-Telegram and Sun, the Chicago Sun and the Paris (France) Post. More recently he has been a columnist for the North American Newspaper Alliance and his column is now published in more than 100 newspapers. He is the author of Seeds of Treason and JFK: Man and Myth. The material for his new book was gathered during a three-month trip across Asia, Africa, and the Middle East in which he visited some 20 countries.
It is in Africa, that the Chinese Reds have concentrated much of their effort and money and where they have come into direct conflict with Russia. It will be recalled that Chou En-lai embarked on a 50-day safari to Africa late in 1963 with the avowed purpose of both stirring up trouble and winning the new African nations to Peiping's side. Coming on the heels of Russia's abject failure in the Congo and in Guinea, it seemed for a time that the Chinese brand of Communism was winning.
While the Chinese did not make the same mistakes as the Russians, they have made serious blunders of their own. Their representatives could not speak the languages of their host countries. Instead of building factories and other facilities, they concentrated on bribing legislators. They talked a great deal about large-scale economic aid, but as Lasky points out, their deeds rarely matched their words. They sought to exploit the color issue and then consistently snubbed the natives. In contrast, the author notes that "Nationalist China, which is recognized by 14 African countries, has launched her own technical assistance program complete with Peace Corps. And it is operating very successfully."
The failure of Mao's foreign aid policy in Africa was emphasized last summer when Chou was unable to bring off the Algiers Afro-Asian conference that Peiping wanted badly. The new African nations flatly refused to cooperate, despite the huge sums of money Peiping has been spending.
Lasky suggests that the aid programs have widened the rift between Moscow and Peiping. Not only Russia's withdrawal of aid to Red China, but the rivalry in Africa, he points out, has resulted in the amazing spectacle of the two Communist powers denouncing each other in print. Russia has charged that the Red Chinese are financing anti-Russian propaganda in Africa through the illicit sale of opium. The Red Chinese press retaliated by charging Moscow with "paying out filthy lucre to gain adherents in Asia and Africa."
Significantly, Lasky adds, Russia is now channeling an increasing proportion of its foreign aid to countries in which the Soviet competes with the Chinese Communists for local influence and prestige, as in Zanzibar.
It must be said that this book tends to ignore the success Red China has had in such areas as Indonesia and Cambodia. But it does place in a more favorable perspective the results of the aid programs of the free world, and primarily the programs of the United States. Taiwan is an excellent example of the effective use of American economic aid and has become a showcase for democracy in Asia.
While much of the material in this book has appeared in print before, the author puts it in proper focus. The result is a highly readable report which underscores the fact that the Communists are not nearly as successful in the cold war as they have tried to make us believe.
THE JOHNSON TREATMENT
By Jack Bell
Harper & Row, New York, 1965, US$4.95
Reviewed by Chow Chi
President Lyndon B. Johnson is without question one of the dominant world figures of today. It is important for the peoples of other nations to understand the man, his policies in world affairs, and his methods of achieving his objectives. The author of this study of President Johnson, and what has come to be known as "the Johnson treatment", is a veteran Associated Press writer with a background of many years in Washington. The book is, on the whole, a sympathetic treatment and a well-documented insight into the public and private life of the President and is liberally spiced with anecdotes.
Johnson is probably the most consummate politician of his time—and this is not said in a derogatory sense. Whether he is entertaining in the White House, dealing with Congress or running the country, his skill as a persuader is always evident. Bell points out that Johnson himself has said: "I believe the Presidency was conceived as an office of persuasion more than of sheer power."
As is the case with all Presidents, he has surrounded himself with the best advisers he can persuade to join his staff. But Bell makes it clear that the decisions are his alone, and when his mind is made up, there is no further discussion. In carrying out his decisions, Bell says, Johnson carries his determination to the point of ruthlessness. However, he is a shrewd judge of human nature and he prefers to persuade rather than "bully or cajole".
Bell adds: "He blends badgering with persuasion, and flattery with threats. He offers future favors and reminds recalcitrants of help given in the past... Throughout, however, there is a delicate balance in the maneuvering. He never—or almost never—threatened the wrong man, or attempted to twist an arm stronger than his own."
President Johnson is not a man who stands on ceremony or protocol. The author cities the example of the crisis with Panama. That nation had severed diplomatic relations with the United States during the dispute over the Panama Canal Zone. The President, writes Bell, told an aide: "Get me the President of Panama—what's his name—on the phone. I want to talk to him."
"Mr. President, you can't do that," protested the aide. "It isn't protocol. You just can't do things like that."
"Why in the hell can't I?" asked Johnson. "Come on boy, get him on the phone."
The President, the author observes, seems to be a man who cannot live beyond the arm's length of a telephone. Even when he goes swimming at his Texas ranch, a phone is placed on a rubber float and left in the middle of the pool.
Johnson, the author believes, might have been elected President in 1960 if he had not misjudged the seriousness of the Kennedy challenge. By supporting Kennedy for a place on the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate, he gave the Senator a public forum which enabled Kennedy to be identified in the public's mind as an authority on international relations. Johnson could not offer comparable credentials.
However, the author insists, Johnson is very much a President in his own right. He is different from President Kennedy, but certainly no less a visionary, no less energetic and practical. Thus far he has demonstrated an ability to get things done, particularly in Congress, which exceeds President Kennedy's record. He is obviously sensitive to criticism and particularly to criticism of his objectives, which explains why his relations with press have not always been harmonious.
The picture of President Johnson that emerges from the pages of this book does not differ much from the public conception of the man. Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that he has been in the political limelight so long that everything he says and does seems to have political overtones. Bell has written a highly readable book which makes a contribution to the understanding of "the Johnson treatment". Such an understanding is important to the security of the world.