Fredrick F. Chien (錢復) has served as administrative vice minister of foreign affairs (1976-79), political vice minister of foreign affairs (1979-82), and minister of foreign affairs (1990-96), in addition to being the Washington, D.C. representative of the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (1983-88). He is now the president of the Control Yuan. Ever the raconteur, Chien spoke recently with Free China Review about the Taiwan Relations Act.
FCR: What were some of the main events of the 1970s, which necessitated the signing of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) on April 10, 1979?
Fredrick F. Chien: First of all, in 1972, President Nixon went to visit the mainland of China and had the first Shanghai Communiqué. In the following years, the United States embarked on a policy that was called "normalization." We asked specifically: Does normalization mean that eventually there will be diplomatic recognition? The response was: No. At that time, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, Ambassador Marshall Green, made a special trip here to explain Nixon's mainland visit, and he specifically said it did not involve diplomatic recognition. But now, in retrospect, we realize that was not what Nixon or Kissinger had in mind. "Normalization," indeed, meant to have formal diplomatic ties between the two sides.
In '77, when Carter became the president of the United States, we realized that the "mood" of the relationship between the United States and the ROC was starting to change. For example, our ambassador couldn't meet with senior State Depart ment people. So we started to worry.
Meanwhile, the Congress of the United States also worried. So in July 1978, the Senate adopted the Dole-Stone Resolu tion, jointly proposed by Senator Bob Dole and Senator Dick Stone of Florida. And the resolution specifically said that the US attempt to set up diplomatic ties with the PRC should not be done at the expense of the existing ties with the ROC. Now that resolution was adopted, and then we thought that everything would be very smooth, that there would not be any big problem--but we were wrong.
So in the second half of September, Carter instructed Zbig[niew] Brzezinski, the national security adviser, to draft a joint communiqué à la the demands of the PRC--namely, to cut off diplomatic ties with the ROC, to abrogate the defense treaty, to withdraw all American military personnel. Brzezinski thought he was joking, so he didn't pay any attention. Then around early October, Carter told Brzezinski once again, "You should do it." Then he knew it was serious.
So he started to work on the joint communiqué draft, and Carter readily approved it. It was sent to [White House Special Representative Leonard] Woodcock for transmission to Deng Xiaoping. But it took Deng Xiaoping a long, long time to respond. Nothing was heard until November 29. And by then, Deng Xiaoping said only one thing, added one more demand --that is, the United States should terminate all arms sales to Taiwan. Carter readily declined. So when the response from Washington was negative, the PRC said, "Okay, we'll do it." So the negotiation pattern of the PRC is, try to squeeze more from the US. After the US accepted their demands in toto, they still wanted to squeeze more. Thank God Carter stood firm on the arms sales.
When the die was cast, we asked the Americans, "Then what about the future relationship between our two countries?" "Oh," they said, "don't worry. We'll have an 'omnibus' legislation that will cover everything. It will be very good. You don't worry a bit." We worried.
Because, after all, when Congress accepted the resolution--the draft legislation--there was nothing in there. It consisted of three articles, lengthy articles. Only in Article 1, there were several paragraphs dealing with the relationship with Taiwan. And briefly, it said that the relationship that had existed earlier should not be continued, but that we should be able to pursue things the way it used to be. But it's very unspecific. There was nothing substantive. And then we had to work with Congress. Congress was very sympathetic to us, very angry at Carter. Eventually, [the TRA came to consist of] eighteen articles, and most of the articles were written by members of Congress.
In a recent PBS documentary about Taiwan, you state that "the decision to recognize mainland China and to derecognize the Republic of China came as a shock to us," and that in making this decision the United States gave "no considera tion" to the safety of the people and their property. To what extent has the TRA alleviated that original shock?
The shock was very evident, because people on the street were so much taken aback. And many of the leaders in the government, when they were called very early in the morning of the 16th [of December 1978] to the residence of President Chiang Ching-kuo, expressed their disbelief--particularly the premier, Sun Yun-suan, who is still alive. I think the shock was very evident. Whether the TRA has alleviated some of the worries and concerns of the people, I think Articles 3 and 4 of the TRA, dealing specifically with security and arms sales, do alleviate many of the worries. And then, on the real property and other properties of the government and the people of the ROC, the TRA has very clear-cut provisions safeguarding those properties. I must repeat that all those were nonexistent in the "omnibus legislation" proposed by Carter.
When Jimmy Carter visited Taiwan this past March, he said that his decision to derecognize the ROC "was a right one," and that it had been a factor in "the progress of the people of Taiwan [in terms of] trade, commerce, democracy, freedom, human rights, even relations with the leaders in Beijing." What is your assessment of Carter's statements?
I would say that all those good things Carter mentioned have been possible in spite of his decision, not because of his decision. So I think he has the cause and effect in a totally wrong perspective.
Some people here felt that he was even suggesting that his administration...
...that he should take credit? I think there are no grounds whatsoever for him to claim any credit for what has been achieved here. I think the people here, together with a lot of nice people in the Congress of the United States, should take credit.
The words "human rights" appear in the TRA in relation to the people of Taiwan. Looking back at the status of human rights in Taiwan in the late 1970s, would you say that democratization and progress have come "in spite of" the TRA?
No. I think part and parcel of the US foreign policy is the respect of fundamental human rights--this, together with free commerce, democracy, nuclear nonproliferation. They form the four cornerstones of US foreign policy. So there's no doubt of that, that the US promotion of democracy and the US promotion of respect for fundamental human rights--everywhere- -have helped people around the globe to be able to live in democratic systems of government, and to enjoy better human rights conditions. The ROC is no exception.
I recall the days when the TRA was first written. There were people in our government, in our Legislature, who called the fact that it was written there, that human rights should be respected, to my attention. And I told them in no uncertain terms that this was only to be expected. And indeed, we were not particularly proud of the fact that we had the name of quote-unquote "martial law"--but not the reality. Because you know very well, by definition "martial law" means, one, totally abrogate the constitution; two, dissolve the parliament; three, replace the civilian government with a military government; and four, totally suspend the basic rights of the people. We didn't have any one of them then--or earlier. But we were calling ourselves under quote-unquote "martial law." This was totally erroneous.
I tried to explain this to our leaders so many times, that we had been accused of adopting martial law, but actually we hadn't. And there's no reason for that. So, after a long, long wrangling with my government, I am pleased to say that finally, in October 1986, we decided to do away with that. It's step by step. It's not overnight.
You're saying the term "martial law" should be set in quotation marks?
Well, I would say that it was really not "martial law." It was "certain emergency measures." Some of the crimes that should have been tried in civilian courts, for example, instead were tried in that period by military courts. And if that was the case, then we should say that was the case, and should not use a wrong term, "martial law," to describe what was totally unrelated to martial law.
In a report to the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1980, John Glenn said that "in the House-Senate Confer ence to work out differences in the Act, House conferees adamantly refused to accept even the word 'unofficial' when describing the unique and unprecedented relations embodied in the TRA." From a purely functional perspective, practically, what is the difference between the TRA and "official" diplomatic relations between the United States and the Republic of China?
Okay. Let me start from the beginning. On December 28, 1978, when Warren Christopher led his delegation to visit Taipei, President Chiang met with him in the morning of that day. And during the meeting, President Chiang outlined five basic principles which became the cornerstones of the future ROC-US relationship. These five are security, continuity, legal ity, there's another one, and then, "governmentality." The last one is the most important one, governmentality. We would like to describe the relationship between the US and the ROC as "between governments." And the USA, since the US has recog nized the PRC as the only legitimate government of China, can no longer have any governmental relationship with the ROC--or, for that matter, any official relationship. So the bilateral discussions between the two sides lasted from January until the end of February--two full months. There was a lot of back and forth, and we could not settle our differences. Finally, after long, long discussions, the two sides worked out a formula: to agree to disagree. So the US would say that future ties between the US and Taiwan are totally "unofficial" and "informal." We would not challenge that. We would say that the relationship between the United States and the ROC has a "character"--a "quality"--of officiality. The US does not challenge us. This was the final solution.
And in the TRA lawmaking process, various members of Congress tried first to reverse what Carter had done toward the PRC. One of the proposals in the TRA was to negate the US recognition of the PRC, which was voted down. The second was a proposal to allow the ROC to set up "consulate-generals" in the US--that was also voted down. The third was to allow the ROC to set up a "liaison office" in Washington, D.C.--that was also voted down. So you can see that even though members of Congress were very sympathetic to us, when the chips were down, when the US government's actual commitment was put to the test, they always voted with the US government. So, with regard to terms like "officiality," or "official relationship," "government relationship"--no matter how many members would have liked to introduce such terms into the TRA, it was not possible.
So if you look at the TRA, and ask us, "Do you feel bad about this law?" I would only say: No law is good enough to replace formal diplomatic ties. Because this is the net result of derecognition. As a result of derecognition, you cannot have official ties. And that is something we feel inadequate about the TRA. But there's nothing we can do. Nothing could be done.
--interview by Kristopher Kowal