A cornerstone of Washington's China policy, the Taiwan Relations Act is after twenty years still heatedly discussed. Since the law itself requires interpretation whenever it is applied, its implementation depends on the US attitude--as well as the overall atmosphere of the world community.
It was like a bolt from the blue when Washington switched its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, because it was hard for most people in Taiwan to ignore the feeling that the United States had turned its back on the ROC, its long-term ally. Disbelief also lingered in the States, especially among Congress members and national opinion leaders. The shock and anger of ROC citizens were expressed through protests and letters to the US administration; the US Congress, for its part, stepped in by rejecting the "omnibus bill" proposed by then-US President Jimmy Carter and taking into its own hands the drafting of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) through discussion, debate and resolution.
"The TRA is the result of dissatisfaction from the US Congress," says Ambassador-at-large Loh I-cheng, who in 1979 was serving as the ROC's information director in Washington. "First of all, congressmen questioned why Carter had accepted the three pre-conditions set by Deng Xiaoping so easily. Such an acceptance rendered the seven-year insistence on certain US principles by President Nixon and President Ford meaningless. Second, the United States is, after all, a country of decency. The TRA is a rebuttal to Carter's careless decision, aimed at lessening the damages his actions brought to Taiwan."
From 1979 on, the TRA has been serving as the legal framework governing relations between the United States and the ROC. While bilateral ties have been sustained and two-way exchanges have grown over the years, the twentieth anniversary is a good time for the ROC to examine the recent past and to work harder for a better tomorrow. As Loh says, no matter whether there is any treaty or law, good international relations depend more on the sincerity and effort of all parties con cerned. In the end, every country has its own national interests to pursue and protect.
How well have the TRA provisions been carried out? Joanne Jaw-ling Chang, a research fellow at Academia Sinica's Institute of European and American Studies, says her feelings toward the TRA are mixed. For one thing, "it is unofficial, though it covers bilateral ties in every aspect, save the political." On the other hand, "the TRA has helped provide a peaceful as well as stable environment for Taiwan to develop economically and politically. The security guarantee mentioned in the TRA also serves as a safety net for people in Taiwan."
Chang's opinion is shared by Bau Tzong-ho, dean of National Taiwan University's Political Science Department. "There was a lapse in the 1954 Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty after the recognition switch, but the TRA stipulates that the United States will take action after going through the relevant constitutional process if mainland China uses 'other than peaceful means' to solve the Taiwan question and endangers the peace and stability of the Western Pacific area. Although the article does not specify what actions they will take, it has already to some degree served as the US expectation and commit ment to peace and stability in the region."
David S. Chou, professor at National Chengchi University's Department of Diplomacy, views the security issue from a regional perspective. He points to the provision in the TRA in which Washington says it will provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character. "Although we may not be satisfied with the quality and quantity of weaponry the United States provides, such arms at least maintain the military balance in the West Pacific Rim."
On the issue of Taiwan's security, Shaw Yu-ming, deputy secretary-general of the ruling Kuomintang and former direc tor of the Institute of International Relations, also lauds the TRA as effective and flexible. "According to Section 3(a) of the TRA, 'the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability,'" Shaw reads. But how much is "sufficient"? And what exactly is "necessary"? "It depends on our substantive relations with the United States," Shaw responds. For instance, he asks, "Why did President George Bush decide in 1992 to sell 150 F-16s to us? Because he thought the cross-strait military powers were out of balance. Although Bush's move was not in line with the August 17 communiqué Washington had signed with Beijing in 1982, he claimed that the F-16 fighters were defensive in nature." Professor Chou agrees. "The reason Bush gave was that the F-5E [the mainstream of the ROC's air force equipment in 1992] was no longer produced in the States, so no more spare parts could be supplied."
The ruling party official cites the 1996 missile crisis in the Taiwan Strait as an example of how the TRA has been applied. "In the past, Beijing was not sure whether the TRA had teeth, so it tried military exercises near Taiwan. Prior to that, the United States did not know how it would carry out the TRA because nothing special had happened. But when crisis comes, Washington faces it and handles it in accordance with the TRA. I think all three parties--Taipei, Washington and Beijing--have learned something from this experience."
But there have also been some setbacks concerning this US domestic law, according to Chang. "The first one was the August 17 US-PRC joint communiqué. The TRA says that the US president and Congress jointly have the right to decide the quality and quantity of arms sales to Taiwan. The decision will be based upon Taiwan's needs and whether the US adminis tration deems each of our requests appropriate and sufficient. Mainland China is not to be a factor. However, with the August 17 communiqué, Beijing tried to ask for a gradual decrease in quantity while limiting the quality to below the 1982 level."
The second setback appeared in the 1994 Taiwan Policy Review, Chang goes on to say. According to that document, she says, "high-ranking ROC officials, including the president, vice president, premier, and vice premier, can only transit in the United States. In the past, our vice president and premier could visit the States in their private capacity [permitted on a case -by-case basis]. Although the US Congress overturned the administrative move in 1995 [thus making possible a trip to Cornell University by President Lee Teng-hui], Beijing responded by launching several rounds of missile drills in 1995 and 1996."
As for the third setback, Chang points to President Bill Clinton's "three noes" statement after his summit meeting with mainland President Jiang Zemin last year. "While the TRA refuses to be used 'as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization,' Clinton's third no--that the United States does not believe 'that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement'--runs counter to the TRA spirit."
Even so, Clinton's statement has not created the effect Beijing would prefer, Shaw says. "Although mainland China can now claim that PRC-US relations are based on the three joint communiqués and Clinton's three-noes statement, the latter's power is limited. While Russia has promised not to sell arms to Taiwan, Japan has declined the third no, the one about Taiwan's international participation."
Chang suggests that the ROC government deal with the United States prudently, because it is hard to know in advance what the response will be. "When we wanted to buy the FX aircraft in 1981, all we got was the August 17 communiqué. When we lobbied for President Lee's US visit in 1994, we got a review with new restrictions. And our campaign for joining the United Nations can be considered a remote cause of Clinton's statement, which makes it hard for Washington to do a U-turn." To prevent the same type of thing from happening again, she urges ROC officials not to announce their intentions before the time is ripe.
In the meantime, Bau points out that Clinton's statement on not supporting "two Chinas" or "one Taiwan, one China" is in line with the ROC government's policy, while Loh stresses that it also serves indirectly as a warning to the pro-independ ence Democratic Progress Party (DPP). "It means that the DPP should not dream of military support from the United States if they make a unilateral declaration of independence," thereby increasing the likelihood of a military reaction from the mainland.
Carter's visit to Taiwan in March of this year also drew much attention from the public, because he said that his decision to switch ties, along with his signing of the TRA into law, helped Taiwan to develop successfully. Chou considers Carter's statement illogical. "What Taiwan has achieved so far has nothing to do with the TRA, but has everything to do with our people's efforts." Chang cannot agree more. "If derecognition does help bring democracy and prosperity, why not try it on the PRC?" she asked at a conference on the twenty-year anniversary of the TRA.
Shaw puts the issue in slightly milder terms. "Carter's words are partially correct. What the United States has provided with the TRA is a peaceful external environment. It is our internal motivation and determination that push us toward political democratization, economic liberalization, and social openness." Bau nods and adds that the TRA "is a force of stability. But there seems no direct correlation between the TRA and Taiwan's current condition."
Ambassador Loh says that, in the meantime, the biggest weakness of the TRA is that it does not define Taiwan's interna tional personality. "The TRA creates a lie and a myth. That is, Taiwan has people but does not have a government. How could this be so?" But Bau holds a different opinion, "Section 4(b)(1) of the law gives Taiwan a sovereign status, to a certain extent." The relevant statement from that passage of the TRA reads as follows: "Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall include and such laws shall apply with such respect to Taiwan."
Other positive signs exist. The 1994 Taiwan Policy Review, for instance, shows some improvement in ROC-US ties. "Certain US government agencies are now open to ROC representatives," Joanne Chang says, "while the United States says it will actively support Taiwan's membership in global organizations that do not require statehood, besides looking for ways for Taiwan's voice to be heard. Although there has been no progress so far, it already shows the US administration's good will."
"Where international participation of the ROC is the concern, Washington has not yet done anything in line with the TRA spirit," Shaw argues. "If we interpret the provisions liberally, we can say that the United States intends to maintain Taiwan's active representation in the world community." While the 1994 review is basically in line with the TRA, the two points mentioned in the review are still waiting to be realized, Shaw adds.
"I personally asked Richard Bush [chief of the American Institute in Taiwan] and Darryl Johnson [director of the insti tute's Taipei office] why the United States did not support but instead waived its vote for Taiwan to gain observer status in the World Health Organization. Their answers were twofold. First, the United States is only a member of that organization, and there is no consensus about how to deal with the Taiwan issue. Second, they asked us to talk about this issue with mainland China," Shaw explains. "They added that the recent cross-strait tension has made them unable to do anything."
The difficulties of implementing the TRA are related to changes in the makeup of the US Congress. Most of those who enacted the TRA are no longer on the scene; nevertheless, support has increased with the ROC's progress. "The main reason the US Congress supports us is our democratic achievement," Shaw stresses. "In the past, we shared common interests in the Cold War era. At that time, we were anti-Communist allies. But now we are partners in democracy. There's a high degree of empathy, because we're co-members in the democratic club." Professor Bau adds another observation about US congres sional support: "Both the Senate and the House of Representatives have passed non-binding resolutions to support continued US arms sales to Taiwan and our international participation."
In addition, as Bau points out, the TRA "stipulates that all US laws are still applicable to the people of Taiwan. There fore, as the ROC still owns property in the States, the people of Taiwan can also ask for legal justice in US courts." All these can be said "to preserve and promote extensive, close and friendly commercial, cultural and other relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan," Shaw adds.
To ameliorate ROC-US ties, Bau suggests more communication with US officials, congressmen, and think tanks. "With this three-way effort, if our relations with the US administration are not as good as they could be, we at least have support from Congress as a balance. Also, we should keep contacting leading American think tanks, no matter which political party they support. From past experience, we know that some think-tank heads are subsequently recruited into the government." Chang holds a similar view, saying that this is also the reason Academia Sinica seized the chance to hold an international conference on ROC-US relations this past April. Bau stresses that the ROC government should remind the United States repeatedly that "the TRA is a law and that a mainland military threat remains. Such a threat exists as long as mainland China refuses to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, while it isolates Taiwan in the world arena."
How about the TRA's impact on cross-strait relations? "The United States hopes Taiwan will move toward a mature democracy, to serve as the lighthouse for mainland China," Shaw observes. "Democracy requires both will and ability. Washington believes that Taiwan can be an example for the Chinese mainland to follow, and thus serve as a catalyst for the mainland's democratization. Mainland China has been developing into a place of rapid economic growth and strong military forces, and the United States definitely does not want Beijing to continue to be a one-party dictatorship or to become a warmonger."
Chang agrees. "The United States believes that democratic countries will not fight against one another, so it wants to help transform mainland China into a democratic state. In this regard, Taiwan can function as a guide. Washington is trying to make mainland China a normal member of the global village, so it utilizes an engagement policy in the hope of winning the mainland's cooperation. However, as there are only four Communist countries left in the world, it is understandable that the PRC worries about US intentions. It seems that mutual trust between Washington and Beijing should be improved."
Can the ROC's formal ties run parallel to its relations with mainland China? Professor Bau says the effect of the TRA in this regard is twofold. "Positively, it maintains a military balance between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. However, it is also the cause of cross-strait tension." But Chang thinks the issue is manageable. "The period from 1991 to 1994 was quite good at both," she says. "The United States supported us in our efforts to join the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, to become an observer of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, while selling F-16s to us and sending Cabinet-level officials to Taiwan. Meanwhile, we set up the Straits Exchange Foundation and Beijing established the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait as intermediary bodies for dialogue. And the heads of these two agencies, Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan, met in Singapore in April 1993. Therefore, I think if we manage things well, it's not necessarily a zero -sum game."