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Rising Peacefully or Just Rising?

• Byline:AXEL BERKOFSKY
• Publication Date:07/01/2008

In April, Vincent Siew, fifth right, then vice president-elect, landed in Hainan, China to attend the Boao Forum for Asia. (Photo by Central News Agency)

As China seeks to project the image of a benevolent force in Asia and hopes to steer regional integration, some analysts are worried that more power might go to its head.

In recent years, Chinese leaders have sought to portray their nation as a "soft power." The country's growing influence should be embraced not feared, they say, contending that the nation's economic clout can be shared among countries in the region and act as a force for stability and harmony.

Others claim that China is not a "soft power," even if Beijing likes to present itself as one in Asia, and note that soft powers do not threaten other countries militarily (as China does Taiwan), do not detain human rights activists and journalists on a regular basis and surely do not end violent demonstrations with more violence as in Tibet. China, however, is doing all of that.

Nonetheless, and the recent Tibet debacle aside, China's diplomatic activism in East, Southeast and South Asia of recent years is impressive and ongoing. Backed by soothing political rhetoric and more importantly by an economy growing by 11 percent annually, Beijing is offering alleged win-win political and economic partnerships all over Asia.

That is, all over Asia minus Taiwan, of course. Mainly thanks to Beijing's efforts to exclude Taiwan from essentially all regional integration efforts in recent years, Taiwan is the forgotten or neglected player of Asian regional integration and of a regionalism increasingly driven and dominated by China. Sadly, talking about Taiwan in the context of regional integration (or anything else for that matter) remains a taboo for many Asian governments when China is in the same room.

Without a doubt, Beijing is making sure--typically through a combination of threats and economic sweeteners offered to Southeast Asian nations--that Asian regional integration goes ahead as if Taiwan did not exist. Democratic Taiwan, however, does exist and it is odd, to say the least, that a non-democratic country is allowed to equip itself with the mandate to dictate to democratic or semi-democratic Asian countries regarding what level they are allowed to deal with Taiwan.

Despite being a fully functioning democracy and Asia's fifth largest economy (if one includes India), Taiwan will continue to observe regional integration mainly from the outside. It will have to count for support on the United States, Japan and a few others less scared of Chinese "retaliation" for talking with or about Taiwan.

Unfortunately, US and, closer to home, Japanese regional integration policies, initiatives and responses have been insufficient. Both Tokyo and Washington need to strengthen their efforts to foster and support Asian regional integration or else leave such integration to China.

Rhetoric and Reality

In the meantime, China is continuing to "rise peacefully," according to Beijing, while pursuing the establishment of a "harmonious international society" that lets the whole of Asia enjoy the benefits of rapid economic growth and development. That sounds good on paper, but China's political rhetoric and propaganda does not necessarily match the realities of Chinese foreign and security policies in the region, and Chinese "regional altruism" is reaching its limits fairly quickly.

Jorn Dosch, a professor of Asia Pacific Studies at England's University of Leeds, argues in last November's issue of the journal Asian Perspective that China is slowly but surely turning into what he refers to as a "hegemonic stabilizer," indicating that China is all for regional integration and reconciliation, but on its own terms. Then again, the jury may still be out on whether Beijing's foreign policy approach will be win-win for China and Southeast Asia, or whether it will instead turn the nations of Southeast Asia into Beijing's vassals and the region into China's geo-strategic backyard.

Since 2003, China's foreign policy has been formulated according to its so-called "peaceful rise" policy. Under to this policy--first publicly articulated by the influential Zheng Bijian, chairman of the China Reform Forum--China's rising global and regional economic and political influence will not turn the nation into a bully securing and defending its interests with military force. Instead, Zheng wrote in Foreign Affairs back in 2005, China will rise peacefully while contributing to regional and global stability through its own rapid economic development.

Beijing's policymakers these days are taking the "peaceful rise" theory to the next level, announcing on a regular basis that China is not planning to become a regional hegemon, and that it will contribute to the "democratization of international politics." While this sounds promising, as these statements come from a non-democratic country, they must be viewed with caution.

China's peaceful rise policies in Asia have been accompanied by the settlement of a number of border disputes, as well as strengthened ties with ASEAN. Nonetheless, Beijing remains involved in a number of territorial disputes with East and Southeast Asian nations. China argues with Taiwan and Japan over the Senkaku (Japanese)/Diaoyutai (Chinese) Islands in the East China Sea, as well as with a number of Southeast Asian nations over ownership of the Spratly Islands and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea.

While Beijing has shown itself willing to discuss these and other territorial disputes with its neighbors in principle, it has repeatedly made clear that large parts of the South China Sea are Chinese territory and consequently not subject to territorial disputes in the first place. To be sure, the stronger Beijing becomes economically and militarily, the less it will become willing to make concessions with regards to the disputed territories.

What is more, the annual double-digit rise of Beijing's defense spending does not exactly portray China as peaceful or "peace-loving" as Beijing's policymakers describe themselves and the country. Chinese leaders have yet to satisfactorily explain why the nation's defense spending is growing by 18 percent per year or just who China needs to defend itself against.

While Taiwan would certainly have an answer to that question, Beijing maintains that the money is being spent on the modernization of outdated military equipment and on rising personnel costs. The Chinese government claims that increased soldiers' salaries account for 30 percent of the rise in defense spending.

Murky Motives

On the record, Southeast Asia welcomes China's economic rise and is enjoying expanding trade and business relations with Beijing. Off the diplomatic record and in Southeast Asian academic and policy-oriented circles, on the other hand, there are concerns about Chinese dominance and indeed economic, political and military hegemony in the region. It is feared Beijing's self-declared "soft power policies" might one day turn out to be less soft and accommodating than China claims. Consequently, much to Beijing's chagrin (and Japan and Taiwan's delight), ASEAN diplomats and policymakers support the continuing stationing of US military personnel in the region, just in case.

 

The ASEAN Summit in Singapore last November. ASEAN policymakers support the continued stationing of US military personnel in the region. (Photo by Central News Agency)

A lot has been written and said about the declining US political and military influence in Asia. However, the 100,000-strong US military presence in the region is still (and for years and probably decades ahead) an "insurance policy" for many Asian countries, above all for Japan and Taiwan, who have put their concerns about the rapidly growing Chinese defense budget very much on the record. Taiwan especially counts on the continuation of close security relations with Washington and Taipei's policymakers are naturally very interested in continuing to make sure that Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait remain on the foreign and security policy radar of the next US administration.

The optimists (although admittedly many of them are Chinese scholars "reporting" to Beijing) argue that China is not only a security partner in Asia, but will, in the long run, also assume the American role of guarantor of peace and stability in the region. China's recent actions in Tibet, its economic and political support for Asia's rogue states North Korea and Myanmar and not least its policies towards Taiwan, however, cast doubt upon such a scenario.

Indeed, in the real world, and above all in Taiwan for obvious reasons, not many believe in the possibility of China replacing the US as a regional balancer. To begin with, steadily increasing the number of ballistic missiles directed at Taiwanese territory is the exact opposite of executing the role of a regional stabilizer.

Sadly, very few policymakers in Asia dare to wonder on the record why Taiwan is not included in Asia's recent economic and political integration initiatives such as the East Asian Summit (EAS), which envisions the establishment of an as yet vaguely defined East Asian Community (EAC) by 2020. Falling back on the so-called "one-China principle" when justifying the lack of enthusiasm to include Taiwan in the EAS might be convenient, but is awkward in view of Taiwan's economic reach in and beyond the region.

Although Beijing might beg to differ, including Taiwan in regional integration initiatives would not automatically lead to a formal recognition of Taiwanese independence amongst Asian nations involved in the proposed EAC. Asian integration is now and for the foreseeable future above all about tangible and measurable economic integration and Taiwan, as one of Asia most powerful economies, could without a doubt make a relevant and important contribution to regional prosperity. If Beijing can be convinced that including Taiwan in Asia's economic and trade integration initiatives and policies does not threaten China's territorial integrity and would not lead to Taipei declaring de jure independence, China's political leaders could adjust its policy approaches accordingly to include Taiwan in Asian economic integration initiatives.

China's willingness to countenance Taiwan's entry into regional organizations, however, remains a big "if" for the time being, even if Beijing has made it very clear that it is ready and willing to do business with President Ma Ying-jeou, who has put economic growth and expansion of trade and business relations on the very top of his political agenda.

Charming the Neighbors

While there is less public talk of a "China threat" in Southeast Asia than in the US and elsewhere, mistrust towards China remains deep-rooted in the region. Asian and non-Asian analysts alike increasingly argue that China will be tempted to treat Southeast Asia like a Chinese vassal. Chinese government-induced nationalism and political rhetoric announcing the re-emergence of China as the "Middle Kingdom" do not help to defuse Southeast Asian concerns about Chinese economic and political hegemony, "stabilizing" or otherwise.

For the time being though, Beijing is using foreign aid, cultural exchanges and peacekeeping to promote a benign public image in Southeast Asia along with economic enticements such as trade concessions and foreign direct investment. In 2000, China took many inside and outside Asia by surprise by proposing the establishment of a fully fledged bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) with ASEAN by 2010. Although many obstacles remain before all involved can enjoy trade free of tariffs and non-trade barriers, Beijing's initiative is widely regarded amongst ASEAN members as China's way of letting them share in the benefits of China's rapid economic growth and development.

In the past, Beijing referred to its envisioned FTA with ASEAN as a "counterweight" to Western (i.e. US) economic interests in Asia. However, it is likely that Beijing's real intention is to cement its regional economic leadership role. Indeed, skeptics in the US and elsewhere fear that China's FTA activism is an instrument designed to marginalize US, Japanese and above all Taiwanese economic influence in the region.

China is seeking to integrate ASEAN into a regional order that essentially reflects hard strategic thinking on Beijing's part and is primarily based on rules established by Beijing, scholar Jorn Dosch and many others argue. "China," Dosch writes, "is acting like a realist traditional big power formulating and implementing its own blueprints for regional order seeking to engage Southeast Asia on its terms. Most ASEAN states have responded positively to this strategy by jumping on the Chinese bandwagon, at least on the record."

However, not all ASEAN countries have joined that bandwagon with equal enthusiasm. Instead, some "hedge" by engaging China while developing or maintaining close ties with the US and other extra-regional powers to balance Chinese influence. To be sure, the US "war against terrorism" and its military campaign in Iraq has cost Washington a lot of sympathy in Southeast Asia, but that has not led to nations there giving Washington the cold shoulder and embracing Chinese real or imagined "soft power."

Destabilizing the Region

Beijing's claims that its regional and global diplomatic policies, as well as its foreign economic policies and increasingly generous financial and economic support, are promoting regional stability and peace across the board must be questioned in at least two cases: North Korea and Myanmar. Beijing argues that providing Myanmar and North Korea with no-strings-attached aid contributes to stability in these countries and the region as a whole as it avoids violent regime collapse with potentially regional security implications. Such an assessment, however, only sounds plausible when one chooses to ignore that the Beijing-backed governments in Pyongyang and Yangon and Nayphidaw are responsible for the instability and economic misery in the first place. Indeed, financial and economic support for unelected and corrupt dictators qualifies as destabilizing policies pretty much anywhere outside of Beijing.

Equally destabilizing are Beijing's occasional threats to "re-unify" Taiwan with the mainland by military force if "necessary." While Beijing's authorities insist that the so-called "Taiwan issue" is an internal affair, many (non-Chinese) analysts argue that stability and peace in the Taiwan Strait is instead an issue relevant to regional and international security, not least in view of the enormous amount of crude oil being shipped through the strait.

Needless to say, Taiwan is not part of China's charm offensive policies in Asia. Taiwan remains on the receiving end of Beijing's confrontational regional diplomatic and security policies and will continue to depend on moral and (typically cautious) verbal support from countries including Japan and the United States. Other supporters, at least in theory, also include the European Union, whose position on the so-called "Taiwan issue," however, must unfortunately be described as the very opposite of "outspoken." Despite soaring bilateral trade amounting to more than €50 billion (US$78.2 billion) annually and the fact that more than 10,000 Europeans live in Taiwan, Brussels typically limits itself on the record to declaring its support for a peaceful solution to the so-called "Taiwan issue."

Thanks to Beijing, Taipei is left to look at Asia's regional integration agenda from a distance while most Asian countries obediently follow Beijing's "orders" not to engage Taiwan in regional integration initiatives. Worse, the more powerful China becomes economically, the more difficult it will become for Taiwan to make its voice heard in Asia and beyond.

Like it or not--and those leaning toward democracy should not--Taiwan might continue to be overlooked with Beijing looking over everybody's shoulder. If that happens, China's so-called "regional integration" will lead to nothing more than regional hegemony.

Copyright © 2008 by Axel Berkofsky